Justification logics are refinements of modal logics, where justification terms replace modalities. Modal and justification logics are connected via the so-called realization theorems. We develop a general constructive method of proving the realization of a modal logic in an appropriate justification logic by means of cut-free modal nested sequent systems. We prove a constructive realization theorem that uniformly connects every normal modal logic formed from the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 with one of its justification counterparts. We then generalize the notion of embedding introduced by Fitting for justification logics, which enables us to extend our realization theorem to all natural justification counterparts. As a result, we obtain a modular realization theorem that provides several justification counterparts based on various axiomatizations of a modal logic. We also prove that these justification counterparts realize the same modal logic if and only if they belong to the same equivalence class induced by our embedding relation, thereby demonstrating that the embedding provides the right level of granularity among justification logics.
Introduction
Justification logic. The language of justification logic is a refinement of the language of modal logic. It replaces the single modality by a family of the so-called justification terms. While a modal formula A can be read as A is provable or A is known, a justification counterpart t : A of this formula is read as t is a proof of A or A is known for reason t. By introducing operations on terms, justification logic studies the operational content of modality in various modal logics. In this paper, we develop a method for testing whether a given set of operations on justifications is sufficient to represent a given modal logic defined via a nested sequent system. We also apply the method to study comparative strengths of several such sets of operations.
The first justification logic, called the Logic of Proofs or LP, was introduced by Artemov [1, 2] as a stepping stone for giving an arithmetical semantics for the modal logic S4. Epistemic logic is another promising area of application for justification logics. For example, as shown in [5] , justification logics avoid the well-known logical omniscience problem because justification terms have a structure and thus provide a measure of how hard it is to obtain knowledge of something.
The formal correspondence between S4 and LP, called a realization theorem, has two directions. First, it says that each provable formula of S4 can be turned into a provable formula of LP by realizing, i.e., replacing, instances of modalities with justification terms. The converse direction says that replacing all terms in a provable formula of LP with modalities results in a modal formula provable in S4. Similar correspondences have been established for several other modal logics by means of various proof methods (see an overview in [3] ).
• S4the use of one-sided nested sequent calculi for modal logics, which is more common and also minimizes the number of propositional sequent rules, thereby shortening our proofs. At the same time, justification formulas are given in a more traditional format, with falsum and implication as primary propositional connectives. As a result, the process of realization also encompasses a Boolean translation between two complete systems of propositional connectives. Not distinguishing between primary and defined connectives in either language enables us to perform these translations implicitly, except for cases where a Boolean transformation affects justification terms. Modal language. Modal formulas are given by the grammar
where i ranges over positive natural numbers, P i denotes a proposition, and ¬P i denotes its negation. The negation operation is extended from propositions to all formulas by means of the usual De Morgan laws, with ¬¬P i := P i . Using this negation operation, we define (A → B) := (¬A ∨ B). Equivalence is defined as usual, and ⊥ := (P j ∧ ¬P j ) for some fixed proposition P j .
Justification language. Apart from formulas, the language of justification logic has another type of syntactic objects called justification terms, or simply terms, that are given by the grammar variable. The binary operations · and +, which are left-associative, are called application and sum respectively. The unary operations !, ?, and? are called positive introspection (or proof checker), negative introspection, and weak negative introspection respectively. Terms that do not contain variables are called ground and are denoted by p, with or without a sub-and/or a superscript, whereas arbitrary terms are denoted by t and s, with or without a sub-and/or a superscript. We use the notation t(x i 1 , . . . , x i n ) for terms that do not contain variables other than x i 1 , . . . , x i n .
Justification formulas are given by the grammar
where P i denotes a proposition, as in the modal language, and t is a justification term. The remaining Boolean connectives are defined as usual. While writing formulas, we assume that implication is right-associative and that both conjunction and disjunction bind stronger than implication.
Modal logics and their axiom systems. One of our goals is to prove a uniform realization theorem for all modal logics in the so-called modal cube from [18] (see Fig. 1 ). All these logics are extensions of the basic normal modal logic K that are obtained by taking its axiom system from = 32 such axiom systems because several axiom systems may yield one modal logic. For the modal logics with variant axiomatizations, we distinguish these axiomatizations because we realize them individually, thereby providing alternative realizations for such modal logics. To this end, we adopt the following naming conventions. Axiom systems are denoted by listing the (always present) axiom k, followed by the names of the axioms added to the axiom system for K from Fig. 2 , with all letters capitalized. For example, KD45 is the axiom system with additional axioms d, 4, and 5. If a logic from the cube has only one such axiom system, we use the same notation for both the logic and the axiom system, except that some logics traditionally have the initial letter 'K' omitted from their names: for instance, the logic of the axiom system KD45 is often called D45.
Two of the logics predate this modular axiomatization and, hence, bear traditional names S4 and S5. The former is the logic of the axiom systems KT4 and KDT4, while the latter is the logic of the following 13 axiom systems: KT5, KDT5, KDB4, KTB4, KDTB4, KDB5, KTB5, KDTB5, KT45, KDT45, KDB45, KTB45, and KDTB45. Further, the three axiom systems KB4, KB5, and KB45 produce the same modal logic, which, following [18] , we call KB5. Thus, there is a small ambiguity between the logic KB5 and the axiom system KB5, which will be resolved by explicit typification, as in this sentence. Finally, the axiom systems KT and KDT produce the same modal logic, as do the axiom systems KTB and KDTB. The traditional names for these logics are M and B respectively. To avoid confusing the latter with the logic KB, where the initial letter is omitted, we use TB instead of B. By analogy, T is used instead of M.
Justification logics and their axiom systems. The 15 modal logics of the modal cube are realized into 24 justification logics that we similarly define as extensions of the basic justification logic J. Its axiom system, also denoted J, consists of the axioms and rules given in Fig. 4 ; the iAN-rule is called iterated axiom necessitation. We define the zero-premise iAN-rule as a rule and not as an axiom to prevent it from referring to itself. The finiteness of the set of propositional axioms in taut is required for the results on embedding in Section 6 (it is also a standard requirement for proving decidability and estimating complexity of justification logics). To define extensions of the system J, we add to its axiom system the justification axioms jd, jt, jb, j4, and j5 from Fig. 3 in various combinations.
The axioms j4 and jt occur already in Artemov [1] ; jd and j5 were introduced by Brezhnev [7] and by Pacuit [22] respectively. The axiom jb, as presented here, is new but has been independently proposed by Meghdad Ghari in an unpublished manuscript. The idea to use a new operation? rather than rebrand ? to mimic the modal axiom b is consistent with the general policy that incomparable axioms should be realized via different operations (cf. Remark 6.19).
Naming conventions. The naming conventions for justification logics and their axiom systems are similar to those for modal logics. For example, the axiom system JB5 is J extended by the axioms jb and j5, and its logic is also denoted JB5. The only exceptions from the one-axiom-system-per-justification-logic rule are due to the fact that all instances of the axiom jd are also instances of jt. Hence, adding the axiom jd to an axiom system that already contains jt does not change the logic, thereby creating for it a second axiomatization. Accordingly, we omit the letter 'D' from the names of all the 8 logics with two axiom systems each. For instance, the logic JT5 is the logic of the axiom systems JT5 and JDT5. Note that in all the other cases, every two axiom systems yield different logics simply because their sets of axioms are different and so are their sets of provable formulas of the form c 1 i : A, where A is an axiom instance and c 1 i is a constant of level 1. Unless stated otherwise, from this point on, by a justification logic we mean the logic of either the axiom system J or one of its extensions. Likewise, by a modal axiom system we mean either the axiom system K or one of its extensions, and by a modal logic we mean the logic of a modal axiom system. We denote an arbitrary modal axiom system, modal logic, and justification logic by AS, ML, and JL respectively.
We have named the axiom systems in such a way that each modal axiom system has a natural corresponding justification axiom system, and vice versa. The names of corresponding systems differ only in the first letter: K for a modal axiom system and J for a justification one. For example, KT45 corresponds to JT45.
Realization theorems. A deeper correspondence between modal and justification logics is established by realization theorems. The first realization theorem was proved by Artemov [1, 2] for the modal logic S4. It connects S4 with a justification logic that he called LP, or the Logic of Proofs, and that we mostly refer to as JT4 (note that JT4 is indeed the justification axiom system that corresponds to KT4, one of the axiom systems of S4).
Realization theorems are formulated using a natural translation function from justification to modal formulas:
Definition 2.4 (Forgetful Projection and Realization). Given a justification formula A, its forgetful projection A
• is defined by induction on the structure of A:
• , and (t : A)
The forgetful projection of a set X of justification formulas is the set of their forgetful projections: X
A justification logic JL realizes a modal logic ML if JL • = ML: i.e., if the forgetful projection of the set of theorems of JL is exactly the set of theorems of ML.
In the next section, we impose an additional standard restriction on realizations: namely, diamonds (i.e., negative boxes) should be realized by distinct variables.
To date, no systematic study exists of the effects of variant axiomatizations of a modal logic on its realizations. In this paper, we present such a study and provide realizations that are based on alternative modal axiomatizations and are modular in the following sense: given an axiom system AS for a modal logic ML, the justification axiom system that corresponds to AS yields a justification logic that realizes ML. To this end, we say that every modal logic ML has one or several justification counterparts , i.e., the justification logics of justification axiom systems that correspond to one of the modal axiom systems of ML. In particular, the justification counterparts of KB5 are JB4, JB5, and JB45. The ones for S5 are JT5, JTB5, JDB5, JT45, JTB45, JDB45, JTB4, and JDB4. Every other modal logic has exactly one justification counterpart, e.g., JD45 for D45.
Preparation for realization
Proving realization theorems involves turning provable formulas of a given modal logic into provable formulas of a corresponding justification logic by replacing occurrences of with terms and of with variables. We employ an induction on a given sequent-style derivation. In order to describe this constructive procedure, we introduce realization functions that assign terms to modalities. To distinguish between different occurrences of modalities in a formula, we annotate them with distinct natural numbers, using parity to distinguish between 's and 's. These annotations, which we adopt and adapt from [16] , are purely syntactic devices and have no semantic meaning. In this section, we also describe technical machinery to be used for operating with realization functions, including their interaction with substitutions. In addition, we formulate the Internalization Property (Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 3.5) enjoyed by all the justification logics, which is necessary for proving realization theorems, and state the Merging Theorem by Fitting (Theorem 3.11), which plays a major role in our method of realization. Definition 3.1 (Annotations). Annotated modal formulas, or simply annotated formulas, are given by the grammar
where i, k, and l range over positive natural numbers, P i and ¬P i denote a proposition and its negation, as in the unannotated modal language. If A ′ is a modal formula obtained from an annotated formula A by dropping all indices on its modalities, then we call A an annotated version of A ′ . An annotated formula is called properly annotated if no index occurs twice in it.
We mostly work with properly annotated formulas, for which the use of negation normal form has a positive effect of every subformula of a properly annotated formula being itself properly annotated, in contrast to [16] . 
Remark 3.2 (Negation and Substitution of Annotated Formulas).
Note that it is not clear how to define the negation operation for annotated formulas. The obvious definition of ¬ k A as k ¬A does not work because it does not produce an annotated formula. In particular, the substitution of annotated formulas for propositions is only possible for positive, i.e., non-negated, propositions.
We now define realizations as functions from positive natural numbers to terms, with a restriction that the set of even numbers is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of variables. This restriction, which is called the normality condition, is standard and corresponds to the intuition that 's (or negatively occurring boxes if ¬ is a primary connective instead of ) represent assumptions on what should be provable and that they become Skolem variables if 's, existentially read as '∃ a proof,' are skolemized.
Definition 3.3 (Realization Function).
A prerealization function r is a partial mapping from positive natural numbers to terms.
A prerealization function r is called a realization function if r(2l) = x l whenever r(2l) is defined. A (pre)realization function on a given annotated formula is one that is defined on all indices of that formula.
If A is an annotated formula and r is a prerealization function on A, then the justification formula A r is inductively defined as in Fig. 5 . Note that if r is a realization function on 2l A, then ( 2l A) r = ¬x l : ¬A r . Further, note that every justification formula B can be written as B = A r for some properly annotated formula A and some prerealization function r.
A basic feature of justification logics used extensively in this paper is the Internalization Property, which enables one to internalize as a term any proof of a formula B, with or without hypotheses. This is formally stated in the lemma below, originally proved for LP [2] . Proof Sketch. This can be easily proved by induction on JL-proof (1). For an axiom, the term t is taken to be a constant of level 1. For an instance of iAN with the outermost constant of level n, the term t is taken to be a constant of level n + 1. For a hypothesis A i , the term t := x i . For a conclusion D of the MP-rule with premises C → D and C , there must exist terms t 1 for C → D and t 2 for C . The term for D is taken to be t := t 1 · t 2 .
Lemma 3.4 (Internalization). For any justification logic
In our realization proof, we mostly use the following form of Internalization, obtained by using the rule MP and the Deduction Theorem. The proof of the latter for justification logics can be almost literally adopted from that for classical propositional logic since MP remains the only rule with premises. Our general method for proving realization theorems is by induction on the depth of a proof in a nested sequent system (to be introduced later) for a modal logic. Since realizations of side formulas need not be the same in different premises of branching rules, these realizations need to be reconciled, which will be done using Fitting's merging technique [16] . In order to formulate it, we need additional notation and definitions, especially the notion of substitution, which also plays an important role in the realization procedure itself. where f S is the restriction of the partial function f to the set S ∩ dom(f ).
Corollary 3.5 (Internalization). For any justification logic JL, if
The following definition is mostly standard (see, e.g., [6] 
Composition of substitutions is defined as (σ 2 • σ 1 )(x) := σ 1 (x)σ 2 for any variable x. Composition of a substitution with a prerealization function is defined as (σ • r)(n) := r(n)σ ; in particular, (σ • r)(n) is undefined whenever r(n) is. Finally, for substitutions σ 1 and σ 2 with disjoint domains, i.e., with dom(σ 1 ) ∩ dom(σ 2 ) = ∅, their union is a substitution defined as follows:
The following lemma is easily proved by induction on a proof of A (see, e.g., [20] Remark 3.9 (Simultaneous Substitution). In Lemma 3.8(2), we formulate simultaneous substitution of several formulas for propositions. Naturally, it would have been sufficient to allow only a single such substitution at a time, but this would have resulted in more cumbersome proofs later on when this lemma is actually used, e.g., in Lemma 5.11. In addition, the proof for the simultaneous version is exactly the same as for the single-proposition version, and the given formulation is more in line with Lemma 3.8(1).
Since the process of realizing a modal formula starts with annotating it, a priori the realizability of the formula might depend on the annotation chosen. The following lemma shows that this is not the case. 
Proof. For every index n of A 1 , let n ′ denote the corresponding index of A 2 . Since both A 1 and A 2 are properly annotated, n ′ has the same parity as n. Let the substitution σ be defined as follows:
For every n > 0, let the realization function r 2 be defined as follows: 
We now formulate the merging theorem, which is an instance of Theorem 8.2 from [16] . There it is formulated for LP, but the proof makes use only of the operations + and · and of the Internalization Property. Hence, the theorem also holds for all justification logics we consider. The following properties are used, often implicitly, in many of the proofs in this paper.
Fact 3.12 (Combinations of Substitutions and Realization Functions).
Let A be an annotated formula, σ , σ 1 , and σ 2 be substitutions, and r be a prerealization function.
( Whenever r, r 1 , and r 2 are realization functions, 
A general realization method for nested sequent systems
In this section, we introduce the formalism of nested sequent calculi and describe a general framework for proving realization theorems based on such calculi. The essence of the method is that realizing arbitrary nested sequent rules can be reduced to realizing their non-nested (or shallow) versions (Lemma 4.11), which is even simpler than realizing rules of an ordinary sequent calculus. As a consequence, in order to prove a realization theorem for a modal logic presented via a nested sequent system, it is sufficient to realize the shallow versions of all the rules of the system (Theorem 4.12). The realization of various (shallow versions of) nested sequent rules and proofs of actual realization theorems are postponed until Section 5. 
We use the letters Γ , ∆, Λ, Π, and Σ with or without a sub-and/or a superscript to denote sequents. 
Sequent contexts are used to formulate nested rules. As an example, the nested version of the exchange rule can be formulated as follows:
One of the instances of (3) is
In the next section, we provide systems of such rules for all the logics in the modal cube and use these systems to prove realization theorems for these logics. In this section, however, we treat arbitrary context-preserving nested rules, i.e., rules of the form
where n is a non-negative integer, Γ { } denotes an arbitrary context, common for all the premises and the conclusion of the rule, and S, S 1 , . . . , S n are sequent schemas. Each context-preserving nested rule ρ has a shallow version sh-ρ that corresponds to the common context being empty, Γ { } = { }:
For instance, the shallow version of the nested exchange rule (3) is
. From now on, by a nested rule we mean a context-preserving nested rule. Contexts provide for an especially simple definition of subsequents:
Definition 4.1 (Subsequent). A subsequent of a given sequent Γ is any sequent ∆ such that Γ = Σ{∆} for some context Σ{}.
Definition 4.2 (Annotated Sequent
). An annotated sequent (context) is a sequent (context) in which only annotated formulas occur and all structural boxes are annotated by odd indices. The corresponding formula of an annotated sequent is an annotated formula defined as in (2), except that the third case is replaced with
Remark 4.3 (Notions Extended from Formulas to Sequents).
Many notions, such as an annotated version and proper annotation, naturally apply to sequents as well. Other notions are extended from (annotated) formulas to (annotated) sequents by being applied to the corresponding formula of the (annotated) sequent. For instance, a realization function on
Whenever safe, we do not explicitly distinguish between an annotated formula A and the annotated sequent that consists of this formula A: e.g., r is a realization function on a formula A iff it is a realization function on the sequent A, which enables us to call it simply a realization function on A.
We often use the following trivial fact without mentioning it explicitly: A realization function on a formula A is trivially a realization function on any subformula of A; the same is true for sequents and their subsequents. Note, however, that realization functions are defined on corresponding formulas rather than on sequents themselves and that ∆ is not in general a subformula of Γ {∆}. The following fact will be used as a matter of course without explicit mention.
Fact 4.5 (Realization Function on a Subsequent).
If r is a realization function on an annotated sequent Γ {∆}, then r is also a realization function on its subsequent ∆.
The following lemma can be easily obtained from the associativity of Boolean disjunction by induction on the structure of Γ . The lemma is needed because, in general, the formula Γ , Σ does not coincide with the formula Γ ∨ Σ. 
Definition 4.7 (Annotated Rule Instance).
Given an instance of a nested rule
′ n , and Λ ′ respectively, sequents Γ {Λ 1 }, . . . , Γ {Λ n }, and Γ {Λ} are properly annotated, and no index occurs in both Λ i and Λ j for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Note that the annotated context Γ { } is the same for every premise and the conclusion. 
of it such that for any realization functions r 1 , . . . , r n on Γ {Λ 1 }, . . . , Γ {Λ n } respectively, there exists a realization function r on Γ {Λ} and a substitution σ that lives on each of
A rule is called realizable in JL if all its instances are realizable in JL.
The following fact trivially follows from the definition.
Fact 4.9 (Realizability in Extensions)
. If a nested rule is realizable in a justification logic JL, then it is also realizable in every extension of JL.
Remark 4.10 (Realizability of Cut).
Currently it is not known whether the cut rule is realizable in J or in some of its extensions. A more sophisticated definition of realizability may be necessary. Fortunately, all sequent systems we use are cut-free. Proof. We prove the lemma for the harder case where ρ has n > 0 premises. The proof for the case when n = 0 is similar and, hence, omitted. We consider an arbitrary instance
Lemma 4.11 (From Shallow to Nested
of ρ and show that it is realizable in JL. By assumption, its shallow version Λ
, which is an instance of sh-ρ, has an annotated version Λ 1 . . . Λ n Λ such that for arbitrary realization functions r 1 , . . . , r n on Λ 1 , . . . , Λ n respectively, there exists a realization function r 0 on Λ and a substitution σ 0 that lives on each of
We prove a stronger statement, namely that for any annotated context Γ { } such that Γ {Λ 1 }, . . . , Γ {Λ n }, and Γ {Λ} are properly annotated and for arbitrary realization functions r 1 , . . . , r n on Γ {Λ 1 }, . . . , Γ {Λ n } respectively, there exists a realization function r on Γ {Λ} and a substitution σ that lives on each of Γ {Λ i }, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
It then follows that the above also holds for some particular annotated context Γ { } = ∆{ } such that ∆{Λ 1 } . . . ∆{Λ n } ∆{Λ} is an annotated version of our arbitrary ρ-instance (4) . The proof is by induction on the structure of Γ { }.
Base case Γ { } = { }. Given realization functions r 1 , . . . , r n on Λ 1 , . . . , Λ n respectively, take r := r 0 and σ := σ 0 . 
By Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term t(x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that
Let σ := σ ′ and let
and r is a realization function on [Σ{Λ}] k by Fact 3.12. Now (6) can be rewritten as 
By Fact 3.12(5), (∆, Π) (7) can be rewritten as
From the induction hypothesis (5), it follows by the Substitution Lemma that
From this and (8), it follows by propositional reasoning that
Since ∆, Σ{Λ}, Π is properly annotated and σ M lives on ∆, Π, it lives away from Σ{Λ};
is a realization function on Σ{Λ} by Corollary 3.13. By Facts 3.12(4), 3.12(7) and 3.12(8), we conclude that
is a realization function on ∆, Σ{Λ}, Π.
By Fact 3.12(5), we have
Therefore, we can rewrite (9) as
which, by Lemma 4.6, is propositionally equivalent to 
By induction hypothesis, for each i = ′ of the rule instance (10) . 
The realization theorem
In this section, we use Theorem 4.12 to prove a uniform realization theorem for all the modal logics: i.e., we prove that the shallow versions of the rules of various nested sequent systems for our modal logics are realizable. This leads to a series of lemmas-essentially one for each rule-of which contraction (Lemma 5.8) is the most interesting one. While there is no principal difference in the treatment of modal rules (Lemmas 5.9 and 5.15), some of the rules require extra work. In this respect, the rules that are used in logics with negative introspection have turned out to be the hardest. In order to make their presentation more readable, we separate parts of the argument into auxiliary lemmas (Lemmas 5.10-5.13 and Corollary 5.14).
Remark 5.1 (Merging and the Contraction Rule).
It is interesting to note that while dealing with contraction (Lemma 5.8) is one of the main challenges of our method, it did not create any problems for Fitting in [16] , where he applies a similar method to sequent calculi. For an advanced reader, it might be useful to ponder on the roots of such an inequality. Merging, which plays a crucial role both in Fitting's and in our method, prohibits repetitions in the annotation, forcing us to annotate the formulas being contracted in a nested sequent differently and prompting the explicit reconciliation of the annotations as detailed in Lemma 5.8. In contrast, Fitting merged things on a formula level and, thus, was able to use the same annotation for the formulas being contracted. The richer structure of nested sequents with its structural modalities, which also require merging, prevents us from using the same trick.
Remark 5.2 (Merging and the Conjunction Rule).
Note that, whereas dealing with the shallow versions of all the logical propositional rules is equally trivial, the case of conjunction would be significantly more complicated in the actual implementation of our constructive procedure. This is due to the fact that conjunction is the only multi-premise rule, by virtue of which the use of merging in Lemma 4.11 is essential for its nested version.
Consider the inference rules in Fig. 6 . The sequent system SK consists of the rules id, ∨, ∧, ctr, exch, , and k. It corresponds to the axiom system K. Extensions of the system SK are obtained by adding further rules from Fig. 6 according to Fig. 7 , where adding 5 means that all the three rules 5a, 5b, and 5c are added. Note that a name in the first row of Fig. 7 now simultaneously denotes (1) a logic, (2) an axiom system, and (3) a sequent system. These sequent systems are essentially the same as the ones in [9] , where their completeness is proved, so we have the following theorem. Proof. Since J ⊢ P i ∨ ¬P i , the nowhere defined realization function r := ∅ suffices. For an arbitrary instance 
is provable in J. Recall that A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 are all annotated versions of A ′ and, hence, have the ''same'' structure. Note also that r 1 is clearly a realization function on B 1 ∨ B 2 for any subformula occurrence B 3 of A 3 .
Base case: B 3 = P i or B 3 = ¬ P i . In this case, B 1 = B 2 = B 3 and, independent of σ and r, (12) can be rewritten as B 3 ∨ B 3 → B 3 , a propositional tautology provable in J. Hence, one can take σ to be the identity substitution and r := ∅.
To prove the induction step, the following cases have to be considered: 
By the Substitution Lemma,
Since C 1 and D 1 , C 2 and D 2 , and C 3 and D 3 are subformulas of A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 respectively, the latter three pairwise sharing no indices, it follows that dom(σ
Fact 3.12(2). It can be similarly shown that vrange(σ
. So σ is a suitable substitution and (13) can be rewritten as
Since σ 
r C . Now (14) can be rewritten as
Finally, by propositional reasoning, it is provable in J that
which is exactly (12) for r := r D ∪r C . It is easy to see, using Fact 3.12, that r is a realization function on the properly annotated formula
Case B 3 = 2n C 3 . Then B 1 = 2k C 1 and B 2 = 2m C 2 . By induction hypothesis, there exists a realization function r
and a substitution σ ′ with vrange(σ
r ′ . By propositional reasoning,
By Internalization Property 3.5, there exist terms t 1 (x 1 ) and t 2 (x 1 ) such that
It then follows by propositional reasoning that
Since dom(σ
, which shares indices with neither B 1 nor B 2 ), the substitution σ ′ affects neither t 1 (x n ) nor t 2 (x n ) because they contain no variables other than x n . As a consequence, (15) can be rewritten as
By the Substitution Lemma and since x n / ∈ {x k , x m }, 
. Therefore, (16) can be rewritten as
Let σ := σ (17) can be rewritten to state the provability in J of ( 2k
r , which is exactly (12) . It remains to note that, by Fact 3.12(1), 
. By propositional reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5, there exist terms t 1 (x 1 ) and t 2 (x 1 ) such that
By the axiom sum, for s :
Thus, by propositional reasoning,
Let σ := σ ′ and r := (r ′ C 3 )∪{m  → s}. Clearly, r is a realization function on B 3 , σ lives on C 1 ∨ C 2 , or equivalently on B 1 ∨ B 2 , and vrange(σ ) ⊆ vars (C 3 ) = vars (B 3 ). Now (18) can be rewritten to state the provability in J of
r , which is exactly (12) .
It remains to note that (12) for B 3 = A 3 and for thus constructed r and σ is 
Lemma 5.9 (k-Rule
It follows by propositional reasoning that
The indices 2m and i cannot occur in either A or ∆ because 2m A, [∆] i is properly annotated. Hence,
is a realization function on 2m A, [∆] i . For the identity substitution σ and this r, (19) can be rewritten as
Lemma 5.15 covers the remaining rules from Fig. 6 . The following auxiliary lemmas are used for the part of Lemma 5.15 that concerns the rules 5a, 5b, and 5c. The following lemma provides a uniform realization for the theorem (A → B)
Lemma 5.10 (Syllogism). There exists a term syl(x 1 , x 2 ) such that for arbitrary terms t 1 and t 2 and for arbitrary justification formulas A, B, and C ,
, by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term syl(x 1 , x 2 ) such that for arbitrary terms t 1 and t 2 ,
The desired result now follows from the Substitution Lemma. Note that syl(x 1 , x 2 ) does not depend on t 1 , t 2 , A, B, or C . The following auxiliary lemma is used in the proofs of Lemmas 5.13 and 6.17.
Lemma 5.11 (Internalized Factivity). There exists a term fact(x 1 ) such that for any term s and any justification formula

Lemma 5.12 (Inverse to Negative Introspection, Internalized). There exists a term invnegint(x 1 ) such that for arbitrary terms t and s and for any justification formula A,
Proof. It follows from propositional reasoning and Internalization property 3.5 that there exists a ground term p such that
For a fixed arbitrary constant c 
By propositional reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a ground term p such that
, by app and MP, 
it follows by propositional reasoning that
Using the jd-instance
which is identical to JD ⊢ r 1 (k) : A r 1 → ¬x m : ¬A r 1 . Since 2m is even, r := r 1 ∪ {2m  → x m } is a realization function on 2m A by Facts 3.12(7) and 3.12 (8) . Thus, for the identity substitution σ and this r,
Case ρ = t. For an arbitrary instance By the axiom app and propositional reasoning, 
Proof. The inclusion JL
• ⊆ ML is easy to prove by induction on a proof in JL since the forgetful projections of axioms of any justification logic are derivable and the forgetful projections of its rules are admissible in the modal logic with the corresponding axiom system.
Let us now turn to the more interesting opposite inclusion. As discussed at the beginning of this section, with the exception of the case of the modal logic K, whose sequent system is denoted by SK, ML also denotes the sequent system (an extension of SK according to Fig. 7) for the modal logic ML. Be it SK or ML for ML ̸ = K, this sequent system is complete with respect to the modal logic ML by Theorem 5.3. By Lemmas 5.4-5.9, the rules sh-id, sh-∨, sh-∧, sh-ctr, sh-exch, sh-, and sh-k, i.e., the shallow versions of all the rules of the sequent system SK for the modal logic K, are realizable in J. If ML ̸ = K, then JL is an extension of J, so the shallow versions of these nested rules are also realizable in JL by Fact 4.9. Let ρ ∈ {d, t, b, 4, 5a, 5b, 5c} be one of the remaining rules of the sequent system ML. It is easy to see from the table above and 
Embedding and the modular realization theorem
So far, we have introduced 24 justification logics. However, only 15 of them are connected to a modal logic by Theorem 5.16. In this section, we define what it means for one logic to embed in another and show that the justification counterparts (as defined in Section 2) of a modal logic all mutually embed in each other and, hence, are pairwise equivalent. This enables us to prove a modular realization theorem that connects every modal logic to all of its justification counterparts, thus yielding a realization theorem that involves all of the 24 justification logics.
The notion of embedding we introduce is quite natural. Consider the situation in modal logic first. It is common to formulate modal logics with a fixed but unspecified complete set of propositional axioms. This creates no ambiguity because the set of theorems resulting from different axiomatizations remains the same. The only change is that, in general, the proof of a formula depends on the given axiomatization; in particular, an axiom under one axiomatization may require a more involved proof under another axiomatization. The situation with justification logics is more nuanced because proofs are represented in the object language. Therefore, for justification logic, different proofs due to alternative axiomatizations become different theorems of the logic, the difference being in the terms used. In the above mentioned case of an axiom turned theorem, a constant that justifies the axiom needs to be replaced with a more complicated term. As a result, an insignificant change in the propositional axiomatization leads to a different set of theorems, i.e., to a different logic.
The idea that this change of the logic is not significant has been captured by Fitting [15] , who was the first to introduce the notions of embedding and equivalence of justification logics. In his opinion, the change of a propositional axiomatization leads to a different but equivalent logic, where equivalence is defined as a two-way embedding. A logic JL 1 embeds in a logic JL 2 , provided there is a mapping from constants of JL 1 to terms of JL 2 that converts each theorem of JL 1 into a theorem of JL 2 .
Fitting's notion of embedding is also sufficient to demonstrate that changing the non-propositional part of the axiomatization in a provably equivalent way and/or changing the primary Boolean connectives of the logic would lead to an equivalent logic (in the latter case, provided the embedding also does the appropriate Boolean conversions). However, as we will soon show, there are justification logics that realize the same modal logic but are not equivalent with respect to Fitting's definition. These logics differ in their sets of operations on justifications. For instance, we will demonstrate that both JT45 and JT5 realize S5, even though JT5 lacks the operation of positive introspection: although ! is present in the language, the axiom j4 describing its properties is not a theorem of JT5.
To explain in which sense JT5 is equivalent to JT45, consider an analogous situation when Boolean connectives are changed. If conjunction is not present in the language, it can be defined via primary connectives. We propose to do the same with operations on justifications. In particular, ! missing in JT5 can be defined via the remaining operations. In other words, j4 can be proved in JT5 if !s is replaced with another term t ! (s). Hence, to obtain a sufficiently general notion of equivalence, we generalize Fitting's definition of an embedding from 0-ary operations (i.e., constants) to arbitrary n-ary operations. Informally, we say that JL 1 embeds in JL 2 , provided there is a mapping from operations of JL 1 to terms of JL 2 that maps each n-ary operation to a term with n distinct variables such that each theorem of JL 1 is converted into a theorem of JL 2 . We call such a mapping an operation translation.
Remark 6.1 (Avoiding Trivial Equivalences).
To see why the property of realizing the same modal logic by itself does not qualify as a definition of equivalence, imagine a ''justification logic'' that is obtained from JT45 by replacing all the terms with a single constant. Such a logic trivially realizes S5, but intuitively it should not be considered equivalent to JT45.
Many definitions and results in this section apply to a more general class of justification logics than the one discussed in this paper. Everything up to Fact 6.11 is general enough to be applicable to logics with any collection of justification terms. Lemma 6.13 and Theorem 6.14 hold for justification logics that satisfy the Internalization Property and can prove sum. The remaining results are specific to what we call the extensions of J. Note that all the results also apply to logics with different languages (recall that all the extensions of J have the same language).
Even though the operations of our logics are at most binary, we want to keep the following definitions as general as possible. Note that, in this general setting, we use prefix notation also for binary operations.
Definition 6.2 (Operation Translation).
Let L 1 and L 2 be two justification languages. An operation translation ω (from L 1 to L 2 ) is a total function that for each n ≥ 0, maps every n-ary operation * of L 1 to an L 2 -term ω( * ) = ω * (x 1 , . . . , x n ). In particular, constants of L 1 are mapped to ground terms of L 2 . For any L 1 -term t, the term tω is inductively defined as follows: for any variable (t 1 ω, . . . , t n ω) . Similarly, for any L 1 -formula A, the formula Aω is inductively defined as follows: for any proposition P i , P i ω := P i ; ω distributes through all Boolean connectives; finally, (t : B)ω := (tω) : (Bω).
Whenever safe, we omit parentheses and write, e.g., * (t 1 , . . . , t n )ω instead of  * (t 1 , . . . , t n )  ω. As an example, let ? be a unary operation in the language of L 1 and ω(?) • ; (3) for any justification variable x, we have that x occurs in Aω iff x occurs in A. By the following two lemmas, equivalent logics realize the same modal logic.
Definition 6.4 (Embedding and Equivalence
Lemma 6.5 (Equivalence and Forgetful Projection)
. Let JL 1 and JL 2 be justification logics over languages L 1 and L 2 respectively.
• . The opposite inclusion is analogous. Let ω be an operation translation that witnesses the embedding JL 1⊆ JL 2 . Each modal formula B ∈ (JL 1 )
• has the form A
• for some L 1 -formula A such that
The realization theorem from the previous section has an additional requirement that different occurrences of be realized by distinct variables. This requirement can also be preserved under embeddings: 
Proof. Let ω be an operation translation that witnesses the embedding
Thus, r 2 is also a realization function. It is easy to check by induction on the structure
Lemma 6.7 (Extension and Embedding). Let JL 1 and JL 2 be justification logics over languages
Proof. Let ω id denote the identity operation translation such that ω id ( * ) := * (x 1 , . . . , In order to show that ≡ is indeed an equivalence relation, we need the following auxiliary lemma. 
Lemma 6.8 (Operation Translation and Substitution
Proof. By induction on the structure of t. If t is a variable x, then (xω)σ
By induction hypothesis, this is the same as
The penultimate equality holds because the only variables that occur in ω * (t 1 ω, . . . , t n ω) are those that occur in one of t 1 ω, . . . , t n ω. 
in other words, for the L 2 -substitution σ :
By definition, * (t 1 , . . . , t n )ω = ω * (t 1 ω, . . . , t n ω). By induction hypothesis, this is the same as
Note that σ ′ (x) = σ (x)ω ′′ for any variable x. Therefore, by Lemma 6.8, we have Our goal is to find sufficient conditions for two logics to embed in each other. Axioms (formula schemas in general) and constants play a fundamental role in this respect. (x 1 , . . . , x n , P 1 , . . . , P k )ω is denoted by Sω.
All the justification axioms from Figs. 3 and 4 are, in fact, schemas written with variables over terms and variables over formulas. From now on, we write them using their formula representations instead. For instance, the axiom j4 is now written as x 1 : P 1 → !x 1 : x 1 : P 1 instead of t : A → !t : t : A, with a variable over terms t and a variable over formulas A. way that it maps c to a single term p that works for every number m. This is not possible because such a p would have to be infinite. The assignment of levels to constants enables us to map constants of different levels to different ground terms. Alternatively, we could drop the levels and change Definition 6.4 in such a way that in order to embed a logic in another one, instead of having a global operation translation, it would be enough to provide a separate operation translation for every formula. Following Fitting [14] , such an embedding could be called local. 3 Earlier in this paper, sum denoted one of the axioms of J. We are using the same name here because these two formula schemas coincide with that axiom. The only difference is that instead of requiring them to be axioms as before, here we only postulate that all their instances are theorems. 4 Naturally, the axiom instances can contain constants. Since conditions (1) and (2) We now return to our restricted set of justification logics that we call the extensions of J, which all have the same language. Corollary 6.15 can be used to prove that for every modal logic, its justification counterparts are pairwise equivalent.
Lemma 6.12 (Iterated Internalization of Schemas
It will be sufficient to provide appropriate operation translations. Moreover, for all such operation translations ω, we can set ω(+) := x 1 + x 2 and ω(·) := x 1 · x 2 , as in the identity operation translation, because the axioms sum and app are present in all the extensions of J.
We proceed to prove that all the justification counterparts of KB5 (among the extensions of J) are pairwise equivalent and so are those of S5. The following is an auxiliary lemma to be used in the proof of Lemma 6.17. 
Lemma 6.16 (Consistency). For arbitrary terms t and s and an arbitrary formula
By syllogism and the j4-instance x 1 :
By contraposition and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term s 1 (x 1 ) such that
From the jb-instance
it follows by syllogism that ¬x 1 : 
By syllogism, (37) is provable in JDB5. It remains to repeat the final steps of the proof of Lemma 6.17(5).
Corollary 6.18 (Realizability of Modal Rules). The following nested rules are realizable:
(1) the b-rule in JT5; (2) the 4-rule in JT5 and JB5; (3) the 5- Proof. To show each embedding, according to Corollary 6.15, it is sufficient to provide an operation translation ω such that for every axiom S of one logic, the formula schema Sω is provable in the other. In the following proof, we provide such an ω for each embedding. Recall that all the extensions of J have common language.
(1) Since ≡ is an equivalence relation induced by⊆, it is sufficient to show a circular chain of three embeddings: 
which is provable in JB4 by Lemma 6.17(4).
(2) Again, it is sufficient to demonstrate a circular chain of eight embeddings:
JT5⊆ JT45⊆ JTB45⊆ JTB4⊆ JDB4⊆ JDB45⊆ JDB5⊆ JTB5⊆ JT5.
Among these, four are immediate from Lemma 6.7:
JT5⊆ JT45, JT45⊆ JTB45, JDB4⊆ JDB45, and JDB5⊆ JTB5.
We now prove the remaining four embeddings.
JTB45⊆JTB4:
The operation translation ω ?-elim defined above witnesses the embedding. Indeed, as in the case of JB45⊆JB4, all the axioms of JTB45, except for j5, remain axioms in JTB4 and their formula representations do not contain ?.
As noted above, the operation translation (39) of the formula representation of j5 is provable in JB4 and, hence, in its extension JTB4.
JTB4⊆JDB4:
The identity operation translation ω id witnesses the embedding. Indeed, since for each axiom S of JTB4, we have Sω id = S, it remains to note that all but one axiom of JTB4 remain axioms in JDB4. The only remaining axiom, jt, with a formula representation x 1 : P 1 → P 1 , is provable in JDB4 by Lemma 6.17 (5) .
JDB45⊆JDB5: The operation translation ω !-elim defined above witnesses the embedding. Indeed, as in the case of JB4⊆JB5, all the axioms of JDB45, except for j4, remain axioms in JDB5 and their formula representations do not contain !.
As noted above, the operation translation (38) of the formula representation of j4 is provable in JB5 and, hence, in its extension JDB5. • . In particular, there exist distinct justification logics that are equivalent. It then follows that one logic may embed in the other without being its subset. Remark 6.23. Alternatively, the modular realization theorem can be obtained by using the fact that, by Corollary 6.18 and Fact 4.9, each rule of the sequent system S5 (KB5) is realizable in every justification counterpart of the logic S5 (KB5). The modular realization theorem can thus be proved similarly to Theorem 5.16, using Theorem 4.12.
Conclusions
We have presented a general method to prove realization theorems constructively and uniformly. It can be applied to any modal logic captured by a cut-free nested sequent system. Proving a realization theorem is reduced to dealing with the non-nested versions of rules, which are essentially ordinary sequent rules without side formulas. In particular, the method has enabled us to realize the 15 modal logics of the modal cube. In the process, we have reproved in a uniform way several known realization theorems and have realized modal logics that did not have justification counterparts before.
We have demonstrated that the realization for these 15 modal logics can be made modular, independent of whether the modal sequent systems are. Our realization theorem is modular in the sense that we produce a justification counterpart for each axiomatization of a modal logic. This modularity has been achieved by introducing an equivalence relation on justification logics that is based on translations of justification operations. This equivalence relation is natural in that justification logics are equivalent iff they realize the same modal logic. Although the modular systems from [11] have turned out to be incomplete, our method should be easily applicable to the corrected versions of these systems that Brünnler and Straßburger are working on.
Since we have introduced new justification logics, an obvious next step is to look for appropriate semantics and proof systems and to investigate the decidability and complexity of these logics. Further, it could be interesting to explore the connections between the equivalence of justification logics and their decidability and complexity, e.g., whether equivalent logics are necessarily in the same complexity class.
It remains an open problem whether each valid annotated formula A can be realized with the additional restriction on a realization function r that whenever 2n B is a subformula of A, the variable x n should not occur in B r . This restriction, called non-self-referentiality on variables, was introduced by Fitting in [16] . The main difficulty of obtaining this extra condition via our realization method lies in the contraction rule.
In this paper, we have only considered justification logics with unrestricted axiom necessitation rule. This rule is often restricted by the so-called constant specifications. We are confident that our results can be extended to logics with arbitrary schematic and axiomatically appropriate constant specifications.
A major open problem is to establish realizability of the cut-rule, or equivalently of modus ponens. It is not known whether cut is realizable with respect to the definition we have given or with respect to some other suitable definition of a realizable rule. A positive answer to this question would allow for direct realization proofs via Hilbert systems and, thus, would probably lead to new realization theorems-for modal logics that lack cut-free systems even in nested calculi, e.g., for logics of common knowledge (cf. [12] ).
